Licensing and Law

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Councillor Handbook: Taxi and PHV Licensing

https://www.local.gov.uk/publications/councillor-handbook-taxi-and-phv-licensing-2021#the-fit-and-proper-person-test

Just Click

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We all need help from time to time in the coming months we will set out your rights and how to deal with some of the issues you may or may not come upon while driving your taxi.

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Transcripts

Shortened Version

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Mingeley v Pennock & Ivory (Employment Appeals Tribunal/1170/02, 18 June 2003) concerned the employment status of a taxi driver.

This was not under the ordinary definition of 'employee' under the Employment rights act 1996, but under the extended definition in discrimination legislation (here the Race Relations Act), which is similar to the 'worker' definition elsewhere.

The driver provided his own car with its own taxi licence.

He could determine his own hours of work and could use a substitute driver.

He paid the taxi firm £75 pw for its booking facilities, and kept the customers' fares. He wore the firm's logo and was subject to the firm's procedures for handling customers complaints.

The question that arises out of this case is whether he Could bring a claim for race discrimination?

Applying the old authority of Mirror Group Ltd v Gunning [1986] ICR 145, CA, with its emphasis on whether the dominant purpose of the contract was for the personal supply of work or labour, the EAT held that he could not, for two reasons.

(1) that dominant purpose here was for the supply of services by the firm to the driver, in order to allow him to ply his (self employed) trade.

(2) in any event, there remained a basic requirement of mutuality of obligations even in this extended definition of employment (as there is in the 'worker' definition, see Byrne Bros v Baird [2002] IRLR 96, EAT at Baili) and here that was absent, the taxi driver being a free agent in relation to accepting fares.

See the full transcript in the licensing and legal section

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Bugbugs Ltd v Transport for London

Queen's Bench Division

21 December 2007

Abuse of process; Licences; Public transport; Taxis

Public transport; Taxis; Legal status of pedicabs

Abstract: The appellant (B) appealed against the refusal of its application to strike out as an abuse of process a claim by the respondent (T) for a declaration that a pedicab was a hackney carriage for the purposes of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 s.4 . A pedicab was an adaptation of a rickshaw, tricycle-like in appearance and having a passenger compartment over the back wheels. Whilst most pedicabs relied on pedal-power, a few were electronically assisted. B leased a number of pedicabs to self-employed riders who plied them for hire. Fares were charged at a set rate per passenger and, unless arranged in advance, the fare did not cover the hire of the whole pedicab, merely a seat therein. T was the public body responsible for licensing hackney carriages, and had sought a declaration that pedicabs were hackney carriages in order that they could be brought within the hackney carriage licensing regime. Prior to T's application, the courts had twice considered the legal status of pedicabs. T's predecessor had been involved in the first case, and T had been invited, but had declined, to intervene in an appeal in respect of the second. Moreover, T had explored the possibility of securing legislation for a separate regime for the licensing and regulation of pedicabs, and had contributed to a draft bill providing for the enforcement of traffic and parking legislation against them. It had not, however, informed either B or the Opposed Bills Committee of its intention to seek, by way of declaration, to bring pedicabs within the hackney carriage regime. In respect of the declaration, the issue was whether the effect of the Transport Act 1985 Sch.1 para.16 was to import the construction of a "stage carriage" contained therein into the definition at s.4 of the 1869 Act so as to bring pedicabs within the definition of a hackney carriage and thus make them subject to the hackney carriage licensing regime. B submitted that T was guilty of abuse of process by (1) seeking to re-open matters that had previously been decided by the court; (2) concealing its changed stance on pedicabs and the way it intended to proceed to achieve a licensing regime for them, and displaying a lack of frankness about its knowledge of the issues raised in previous authorities.

Appeal dismissed. (1) The issue of the status of pedicabs had previously been considered in two cases. In the first, Begg, Unreported December 6, 1999 it was held that a pedicab was not a hackney carriage and that Sch.1 para.16 of the 1985 Act was not intended to convert a "stage carriage" to a hackney carriage as defined by s.4 of the 1869 Act. In the second, R. (on the application of Oddy) v Bugbugs Ltd [2003] EWHC 2865 (Admin), the court found that a pedicab was a "stage carriage" and not a hackney carriage. However, it was not clear that the stipendiary magistrate in Begg had considered the material words of Sch.1 para.16 of the 1985 Act. In Oddy, the court had not considered the issue of Sch.1 para.16 at all. That being the case, it could not properly be said that the issue of the legal status of pedicabs had been decided by a court of competent juridsiction so as to preclude, of itself, future challenge, Begg and Oddy considered. Moreover, it could not be said that T's argument should have been pursued in either Begg or Oddy, there being insufficient privity of interest between T and the prosecution in either of those cases. Further, a failure by a party to raise an issue involving itself in litigation being conducted by a third party should not, save in the most exceptional circumstances, automatically render the raising of the same issue by that party in later proceedings abusive. (2) In deciding whether T had sought to abuse the process of the court, the whole picture had to be considered. Though T could have acted more promptly in informing B of its changed position, there had been no deliberate or dishonest attempt to conceal matters from the court. A system of regulation was necessary for the safe and efficient operation of pedicabs and was plainly in the public interest. T had decided that the most effective way forward was to include pedicabs in the hackney carriage regime and it could not proceed with that course until it had an authoritative decision as to whether, in law, a pedicab was a hackney carriage. Public bodies such as T would inevitably have changes of policy and direction and T's actions had not been those of a party seeking to harass or act unjustly. The master had been fully entitled to dismiss B's application to strike out T's claim.

Judge: Swift, J.

Counsel: For the appellant: David Wolfe. For the respondent: James Pereira

Solicitor: For the appellant: Richard Buxton. For the respondent: In-house solicitor

Significant Cases Cited

R. (on the application of Oddy) v Bugbugs Ltd

[2003] EWHC 2865 (Admin); (QBD (Admin))

Legislation Cited

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) Part 8

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.3.4

London Cab Order 1934 (SI 1934 1346)

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.6

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.7

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.4

Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 (c.34)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(1)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.82(1)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.1

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.137(1)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) Sch.1 para.16

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42)

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R. (on the application of Leeds City Council) v Taxi Centre (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne) Ltd

Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

01 November 2005

[2005] EWHC 2564;

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Adm ... /2564.html

Subject: Licensing

Summary: licences; taxis; delay by local authority in determining application; lawfulness of authority's reliance on new conditions.

Background: The appellant local authority (Leeds) appealed by way of case stated against a decision of the Crown Court whereby it allowed an appeal by the respondent taxi company (Taxi Centre Newcastle upon Tyne ltd) against the decision of Leeds Licensing and Regulatory Panel to refuse to admit Taxi Centres Fiat Doblo adapted wheelchair accessible motor vehicle onto Leeds councils approved list of hackney carriage vehicles.

The original application for the vehicle to be placed on the approved list was made in November 2002. The application was refused in May 2004.

The issue before the Crown Court was whether Leeds panel should have considered the application under the provisions of new conditions, which had taken effect in April 2004, or under the provisions of the previous conditions which prevailed at the time of the application in 2002.

The Crown Court found that in April 2003 the local authority officer to whom the application had been assigned had indicated to Taxi Centre that its application would be granted if certain issues were addressed, that the application had then been transferred to a second officer after the first one had fallen ill, and that the second officer had delayed in reaching a decision and been responsible for "moving the goalposts". The court concluded that Taxi Centre had had a reasonable expectation that its application would be processed with reasonable expedition and under the old conditions that prevailed until April 2004; that had the appellants applied the old conditions, safety would not have been compromised; and that it had been unreasonable of appellants not to consider the application under the provisions of the old conditions.

The question posed for the court was whether the Crown Court had erred in finding that the appellants had been entitled to determine Taxi Centres application on the basis of the old conditions. The appellant argued that the effect of the adoption of the new conditions was that it did not have the power to decide the application on the old conditions, and that if it had taken that course, it would have failed to take into account its own relevant policy.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that (1) the case concerned the exercise of a discretionary power. A public authority could not lawfully fetter itself so as to follow blindly an adopted policy. It had to maintain at least the possibility of departure from an adopted policy in an appropriate case, and it had to keep an open mind as to whether it should depart from the accepted policy in any given case. Whether, and if so to what extent, an authority could depart from its adopted policy would, in the first instance, be a matter for the authority concerned, but its decision to depart had, of course, to be lawful when tested against the well established criteria of public law.

There were situations in which the appellant could depart from the new conditions and apply the old ones without falling into illegality by failing to have proper regard to its new policy. The instant was such a case. Four matters were worth highlighting. Firstly, there had been no suggestion that vehicles which conformed with the old conditions were in any way unsafe or placed the public at risk. Secondly, the appellant had been entitled to retain to itself the right to continue to use the old conditions for good reason. Thirdly, the resolution of May 2004 refusing Taxi Centres application recorded the appellants acknowledgement of the possibility of departing from the new conditions. Fourthly, no vehicle as manufactured could meet the requirements of the new conditions. If there were found to be reasonable grounds to consider for approval and to licence a vehicle under the old conditions, then the appellant had the right to do so. There were reasonable grounds. Accordingly, the Crown Court had not erred when finding that the appellant had been entitled to determine Taxi Centres application on the basis of the old conditions.

(2) (Obiter) (incidental opinion not binding) It had not been necessary for the Crown Court to find, as a precondition of its decision, that there had been a breach of legitimate expectation, or Wednesbury unreasonableness, or an excess of authority on the part of the appellants officer. There did not have to be a ground for judicial review; instead, there simply had to be a good reason for departing from policy.

Judge: Lloyd-Jones J.

Counsel: For the claimant: Ruth Stockley. For the defendant: Alex Offer

Solicitor: For the claimant: Local authority solicitor. For the defendant: Hay & Kilner

Legislation Cited

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.47

Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1907 (c.53) s.7

Supreme Court Act 1981 (c.54) s.48

Supreme Court Act 1981 (c.54) s.48(1)

Supreme Court Act 1981 (c.54) s.48(2)(c)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.37

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.45

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.68

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Green v Kis Coaches and Taxis Ltd

County Court (Plymouth)

07 March 2008

Unreported

Subject: Personal injury

Related To: Buses; Evidentiary facts; Fixed costs; Occupiers' liability; Road traffic accidents; Statutory definition

Summary: Road traffic accidents; Statutory definition; Personal injury claims for falls from parked coaches; Avoiding restricted costs regime by alternative basis of claims

Background: The court was required to determine costs following the acceptance by the claimant passenger (G) of a Part 36 offer made by the defendant coach company (K) in a claim for personal injury. G had sustained injury alighting from one of K's coaches that was parked in a public car park. The basis of the claim was the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 s.2 . G accepted K's Part 36 offer, saying that the payment of her reasonable costs were to be on the standard basis to be the subject of costs-only proceedings pursuant to CPR r.44.12A , the cost to be determined by detailed assessment in the absence of agreement. K replied that in the instant case fixed costs applied, but G stated that, as it was not a road traffic accident, fixed costs did not apply. A bill was prepared for detailed assessment, which K did not contest. K was subsequently ordered to pay G's reasonable costs of the claim on a standard basis. In the points of dispute, K stated that, notwithstanding the fact that the claim had been pursued as a breach of s.2, the accident actually came within the definition of a road traffic accident in CPR r.45.7 , and therefore the costs recoverable were limited to fixed recoverable costs, since the other provisions of CPR r.45.7(2) were met on the facts of the case.

Thus, the issue in the case was whether the accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle.

Judgment for defendant. G had travelled in the coach and her injury had been caused as she was alighting from it. As a result, her injury arose out of the use of the coach, Dunthorpe v Bentley Unreported February 26, 1996 CA considered. Therefore, the accident fell within the definition of a road traffic accident in CPR r.45.7(4)(a) and it was not possible to evade the restricted costs regime imposed by r.45.7 by basing the claim on other grounds.

Judge: District Judge Tromans

Counsel: For the claimant: Non-counsel representative. For the defendant: Lucy Wyles

Solicitor: For the claimant: Nash & Co (Plymouth). For the defendant: McCullagh & Co

Legislation Cited

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.44.12A

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.45.7

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.45.7(2)

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.45.7(4)(a)

Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 (c.31) s.2

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Bugbugs Ltd v Transport for London

Queen's Bench Division

21 December 2007

[2007] EWHC 2987 (QB); [2008] R.T.R. 21; Official Transcript

Subject: Transport

Abuse of process; Licences; Public transport; Taxis

Summary: Public transport; Taxis; Legal status of pedicabs

The appellant (B) appealed against the refusal of its application to strike out as an abuse of process a claim by the respondent (T) for a declaration that a pedicab was a hackney carriage for the purposes of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 s.4 . A pedicab was an adaptation of a rickshaw, tricycle-like in appearance and having a passenger compartment over the back wheels. Whilst most pedicabs relied on pedal-power, a few were electronically assisted.

B leased a number of pedicabs to self-employed riders who plied them for hire. Fares were charged at a set rate per passenger and, unless arranged in advance, the fare did not cover the hire of the whole pedicab, merely a seat therein. T was the public body responsible for licensing hackney carriages, and had sought a declaration that pedicabs were hackney carriages in order that they could be brought within the hackney carriage licensing regime. Prior to T's application, the courts had twice considered the legal status of pedicabs. T's predecessor had been involved in the first case, and T had been invited, but had declined, to intervene in an appeal in respect of the second. Moreover, T had explored the possibility of securing legislation for a separate regime for the licensing and regulation of pedicabs, and had contributed to a draft bill providing for the enforcement of traffic and parking legislation against them.

It had not, however, informed either B or the Opposed Bills Committee of its intention to seek, by way of declaration, to bring pedicabs within the hackney carriage regime. In respect of the declaration, the issue was whether the effect of the Transport Act 1985 Sch.1 para.16 was to import the construction of a "stage carriage" contained therein into the definition at s.4 of the 1869 Act so as to bring pedicabs within the definition of a hackney carriage and thus make them subject to the hackney carriage licensing regime.

B submitted that T was guilty of abuse of process by (1) seeking to re-open matters that had previously been decided by the court; (2) concealing its changed stance on pedicabs and the way it intended to proceed to achieve a licensing regime for them, and displaying a lack of frankness about its knowledge of the issues raised in previous authorities.

Moreover, it could not be said that T's argument should have been pursued in either Begg or Oddy, there being insufficient privity of interest between T and the prosecution in either of those cases. Further, a failure by a party to raise an issue involving itself in litigation being conducted by a third party should not, save in the most exceptional circumstances, automatically render the raising of the same issue by that party in later proceedings abusive. (2) In deciding whether T had sought to abuse the process of the court, the whole picture had to be considered. Though T could have acted more promptly in informing B of its changed position, there had been no deliberate or dishonest attempt to conceal matters from the court.

A system of regulation was necessary for the safe and efficient operation of pedicabs and was plainly in the public interest. T had decided that the most effective way forward was to include pedicabs in the hackney carriage regime and it could not proceed with that course until it had an authoritative decision as to whether, in law, a pedicab was a hackney carriage. Public bodies such as T would inevitably have changes of policy and direction and T's actions had not been those of a party seeking to harass or act unjustly. The master had been fully entitled to dismiss B's application to strike out T's claim.

Judge: Swift, J.

Counsel: For the appellant: David Wolfe. For the respondent: James Pereira

Solicitor: For the appellant: Richard Buxton. For the respondent: In-house solicitor

Cases Cited

R. (on the application of Oddy) v Bugbugs Ltd

[2003] EWHC 2865 (Admin); (QBD (Admin))

Legislation Cited

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) Part 8

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.3.4

London Cab Order 1934 (SI 1934 1346)

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.1

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.6

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.7

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.4

Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 (c.34)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(1)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.82(1)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) Sch.1 para.16(1)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.1

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.137

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.137(1)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) Sch.1 para.16

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42)

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42) s.62

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R. v St Albans DC Ex p. St Albans & District Taxi Association

Queen's Bench Division

19 January 2000

Case Digest

Subject: Local government

Licences; Local authorities powers and duties; Taxis

SADTA applied for judicial review of SADC's decision to end restrictions on the number of hackney carriage licences and to only issue new licences to wheelchair accessible vehicles. The court held that SADC's overall goal was to abolish all restrictions on the number of licences and not simply to increase the number of wheelchair accessible taxis, therefore proportionality was not relevant. There was sufficient consultation time and SADC was not obliged to have conducted surveys on unsatisfied demand for hackney carriages or the financial impact on licensees of its decision.

Judge: Lightman, J.

Counsel: For SADTA: D McPherson. For SADC: K Leigh

Solicitor: For SADTA: Michael Devidecki. For SADC: Council Solicitor

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R. v Crewe and Nantwich LBC Ex p. Barker

Queen's Bench Division

08 March 1996

Licensing

Licensing; Taxis

Taxis; revocation of Hackney carriage licence; failure to reveal guilty plea to offences of dishonesty; conviction valid to revocation

B sought judicial review of a decision of C to revoke his Hackney carriage licence under the Local Government (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1976 s.61. B had failed to reveal that he had pleaded guilty to four offences of dishonesty involving an MOT certificate. He only revealed the convictions once he had been sentenced which was after the licence had been granted. B argued that the council was not entitled to consider the convictions when exercising its power under s.61(1)(b), as there had been no conviction until the sentence was passed.

Held, dismissing the application, that C was entitled to consider the convictions when exercising its power under s.61(1)(b).

Judge: MacPherson, J.

Counsel: For B: G Wood. For CNLBC: A Russell

Solicitor: For B: Keith Cutler & Co (Crewe). For CNLBC: Council Solicitor

Legislation Cited

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.61

Local Government (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1976 s.61.

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https://www.local.gov.uk/publications/councillor-handbook-taxi-and-phv-licensing-2021#the-fit-and-proper-person-test

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